



Kenneth L. Karst† 
When Hugh Caperton and his co-plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, several briefs amici curiae asked the Court to hear the case.  Prom-
inent among these was the brief of the American Bar Association (ABA).  
For a century, the Association has been developing codes of judicial eth-
ics.  These codes have been adopted widely throughout the country, 
mainly as statements of ideals, but occasionally enforced by state courts.  
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.1 attracted the ABA’s attention, and a 
paragraph from its brief introduces the case to my readers: 
This case presents an important and unresolved question regarding 
an issue of increasing concern in courts across the country – name-
ly, whether the constitutional right to due process places limits upon 
a judge’s consideration of a legal matter in which one party was a 
substantial contributor to that judge’s election to the bench.  Here, 
the Chairman and CEO of Respondent Massey, one of the nation’s 
largest coal companies, which had lost a $50 million fraud verdict 
to Petitioners, contributed (both directly and indirectly) $3 million 
supporting the 2004 campaign of Justice Brent D. Benjamin for a 
seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.  These 
campaign contributions, representing more than 60% of the total 
money spent on Justice Benjamin’s campaign, were made at the 
very time Massey was preparing to appeal that verdict.  After an ini-
tial decision was vacated for another judge’s failure to recuse; the 
fraud verdict was ultimately overturned in a 3-2 decision, with Jus-
tice Benjamin casting the deciding vote after refusing to recuse 
himself.  In light of the frequency with which such situations arise, 
and in light of language in past decisions of this Court, the ABA 
respectfully submits that state courts at all levels need guidance 
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from this Court on the boundaries imposed by the Due Process 
Clause.2 
After considering the briefs of the parties and amici, the Court 
granted the writ.  Now the amici grew in number.  The amici supporting 
Caperton warned that spending on judicial election campaigns was in-
creasing rapidly, and they asked the Court to set a minimum standard 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for required re-
cusal of a judge on the basis of contributions in support of his or her 
campaign.  Caperton’s amici went on to suggest that due process de-
manded a recusal in the case at hand, and thus reversal of the state su-
preme court’s decision.  The amici supporting Massey argued mainly 
that matters concerning recusal should be left to state law, because the 
states were actively considering reforms in response to any problems 
presented by campaign spending in judicial elections, and because it was 
impossible for the Court to devise a clear standard to govern applications 
of the Due Process Clause to such cases.  They argued for affirmance of 
the West Virginia court’s decision.3 
The Supreme Court reversed, 5–4.  Justice Kennedy, for the Court, 
concluded that, under the Court’s precedents, the Due Process Clause 
does require recusal when “the probability of actual bias on the part of 
the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”4  
He continued, “Applying those precedents, we find that, in all the cir-
cumstances of this case, due process requires recusal.”5  His opinion 
cited the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and quoted from the 
brief amicus curiae of the Conference of Chief Justices.  Writing the 
principal dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the “probability of 
bias” standard was so open-ended that, far from providing guidance in 
future cases, it would serve “to erode public confidence in judicial impar-
tiality . . . .”6 
In this discussion of the Caperton case, I bring some of the amici 
curiae to center stage—in recognition of their supporting roles.  Ordinari-
ly, at this level, highly competent counsel represent both sides, and they 
tell the Justices what they need to know in deciding the case.  In such 
circumstances, amici—if they appear at all—are likely to add little of 
                                            
 2. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners [for grant 
of certiorari] [hereinafter ABA Brief] at 5–6 (footnote omitted), Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 3199726. 
 3. Massey’s lawyers eventually argued (unsuccessfully) for dismissal of the writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted—a move that would have allowed the Court to get rid of the case without 
expressing any opinion. 
 4. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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substance.7  In some cases, the parties’ advocates may fail to explore the 
available arguments, and briefs amici may be the only well-argued 
guides to decision. 
Caperton lies outside both of these patterns.  First-rate counsel on 
both sides, in their briefs and at oral argument, made the best points 
available, given the facts and the existing law.  In my view, however, 
some of the amici in support of Caperton, et al.8 provided significant 
support in persuading the Court to hear the case and to decide for the 
petitioners.  Pondering the weight of the amici in Caperton, one might 
think, “This couldn’t happen—but it did.”  Here I seek to tell how and 
why it did.9 
A WEST VIRGINIA STORY 
In The Appeal, a 2008 novel by John Grisham, the owner of a 
chemical company seeks to buy a seat on Mississippi’s Supreme Court, 
after a local jury has given a $41 million verdict against his company, 
based on its dumping of toxic waste into a little town’s water supply.  
The owner provides several million dollars to elect a judge of his own 
choice to the court, just before that court is to hear his company’s appeal.  
When Matt Lauer interviewed Grisham on The Today Show, he asked 
whether any specific story had inspired The Appeal.  Grisham said there 
were several such stories, commenting, “huge sums of money get in-
volved on both sides to purchase a seat on the [state] supreme court.”  
When Lauer suggested that this particular story might seem a bit far-
fetched, Grisham replied, “It’s already happened.  It happened a few 
years ago in West Virginia.”10 
                                            
 7. The Supreme Court has taken a generous position, liberally allowing the filing of briefs 
amici.  For the view of Judge Richard Posner that briefs amici should be restricted, and the contrary 
view of then-judge Samuel Alito, see Ed R. Haden & Kathy Fitzgerald Pate, The Role of Amicus 
Briefs, 70 ALA. L. REV. 114 (2009).  Andrew Frey, a prominent Washington lawyer, has written, 
persuasively, that Judge Alito had it right.  See Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the Court or 
Nuisances?, 33 NO. 1 LITIG. 5 (2006).  In Caperton, Frey was on the brief for the respondents (Mas-
sey et al.), and he served ably as counsel in the oral argument. 
 8. Amici in support of Massey appeared only after the Court had granted certiorari.  I refer 
fleetingly to some of these briefs. 
 9. I leave it for others to speculate on the future of Caperton’s due process “floor” for recusal 
in cases involving contributions to judges’ election campaigns.  In addition to this symposium, see 
the three thoughtful comments on Caperton in the Harvard Law Review’s annual survey, The Su-
preme Court, 2008  Term Comments: Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the 
Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80, 88–103 (2009); Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody 
Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104, 114–19 (2009); Penny J. White, Relin-
quished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120,  137–51 (2009). 
 10. W. Va. Politics Basis for New Grisham Novel, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 30, 2008, at 
6C. 
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The central figure in the West Virginia drama is Don Blankenship.  
He is not (formally) a party to this case, but he is the Chief Executive 
Officer of Massey.  A personification of Big Coal, Blankenship has made 
a career converting Appalachian mountaintops into strip mines,11 direct-
ing a work force in which about 3% are unionized.12  Blankenship is ac-
customed to throwing his weight around.  If this means supplying money 
for a campaign to remove a justice who seems likely to vote against 
Massey when the company’s $50 million liability for damages comes 
before the state supreme court—well, that is all in a day’s work.13  The 
target justice is Warren McGraw, a former tough prosecutor and classic 
pro-labor politician, who had been elected to the state senate and even-
tually became president of that body.14  In the ordinary course, Justice 
McGraw could expect to pass through a ho-hum electoral season to the 
customary re-election.  But Blankenship decides to provide funds for 
McGraw’s opponent in the Democratic primary.15  McGraw wins, but his 
adversary gets enough votes to give encouragement to Brent Benjamin, 
the Republican nominee.  Blankenship now turns the money spigot to 
full force. 
Blankenship’s political consultants included specialists in political 
“opposition research,” who can almost always find something that can be 
used to rouse voters’ wrath.  The campaign against McGraw follows this 
pattern.  Anti-McGraw radio messages, television spot announcements, 
and direct mailings are supplemented by recorded phone messages tell-
ing voters to be “scared” of McGraw.16  Of course, these campaign ads 
do not refer to the case that Massey is taking to the state supreme court.  
Rather, they focus on McGraw’s vote in a February 2004 decision in 
which Tony Arbaugh petitioned for release from prison.17  As a teenager 
Arbaugh pleaded guilty to sexual assault, and was given a suspended 
sentence of imprisonment for fifteen to thirty-five years.18  At age eigh-
                                            
 11. See, e.g., Michael Shnayerson, The Rape of Appalachia, VANITY FAIR, May 2006, at 140. 
 12. Deborah Solomon, A Coal CEO’s Unusual Pastime: Firing Up W. Va. Politics, WALL ST. 
J., Feb 13, 2006, at A1. 
 13. With accrued interest, the amount at stake has passed above $80 million and is still grow-
ing. 
 14. In the latter position, he led the campaign for a coal-severance tax, imposed on all coal 
mined in the state, with proceeds mostly going to counties where the coal was mined.  Chris Wette-
rich, Massey CEO Seeks Donations for McGraw Opponent, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug 18, 2004, 
at 3A, available at 2004 WLNR 1204246. 
 15. West Virginia law explicitly treats judicial elections as partisan.  On the blurring of the 
distinction between “partisan” and “nonpartisan” in this context, see Roy A. Schotland, To the En-
dangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397 (2003). 
 16. Toby Coleman, Benjamin May Face Bias Questions Court Winner Says He Is ‘Not Bought 
by Anybody’, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2004, at 1C, available at 2004 WLNR 6248443. 
 17. The story is told in MICHAEL SHNAYERSON, COAL RIVER 78-82 (2008). 
 18. Arbaugh himself had been a victim of sexual abuse when he was a child. 
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teen he was placed on probation, with conditions: no alcohol or drugs, 
compulsory counseling, and a monthly probationary fee.  Arbaugh 
missed some counseling sessions, and he smoked marijuana; for this 
misbehavior, the state revoked probation.  The trial judge thought a long 
prison term was pretty severe for this kind of violation, but said he had 
no choice but to send Arbaugh to prison to serve his sentence.  Arbaugh 
appealed to the state supreme court, which decided, 3–2 (McGraw in the 
majority), to give him another chance.  A social worker from the Marist 
Brothers had volunteered to enroll Arbaugh in a program, Youth System 
Services, proposing that he live in a church community and serve as a 
janitor at a local Catholic high school.  A draft opinion agreed with these 
conditions, but the final opinion, accepted by McGraw, made no refer-
ence at all to school employment.  Arbaugh did not work in a school.  
But when Benjamin’s supporters find the draft opinion, they accuse 
McGraw of voting to place a child molester in a school. 
Blankenship indirectly funds most of the media attack that swamps 
the West Virginia airwaves.  A “527 group” political action committee19 
is formed under the name of “And for the Sake of the Kids” (ASK).  This 
is the vehicle for the lion’s share of Blankenship’s contributions in sup-
port of Benjamin’s campaign.  Week after week, ASK pays for advertis-
ing hammering away at McGraw for being soft on child molesters.20  
Then the Benjamin group strikes pay dirt. 
In a Labor Day speech, the overwrought McGraw fumes and fum-
bles—in short, he has lost it.  Walking about on the stage, grimacing, 
bending over, McGraw says “They follow, looking for ugly . . . trying to 
take ugly pictures to do ugly things with.  (voice rising)  Ugly!  To repeat 
lies.  Things that are untrue.  Who do they think elected me?”  A tape of 
McGraw’s embarrassing performance is passed on to Benjamin’s cam-
paign, which edits it by interjecting its own satirical comments, and 
broadcasts the video statewide.  With plenty of Blankenship’s money in 
hand, Benjamin’s supporters lay an electronic media blanket over West 
Virginia in the final months before the election.21  McGraw loses—West 
                                            
 19. Named for section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, this term refers to an organization 
that is not subject to the Code’s limits on contributions to a political action committee. 
 20. In one ad, a voice begins, “According to the prosecutors, he sexually molested multiple 
West Virginia children.”  Later in the text, it is made clear that “he” does not refer to McGraw, but 
to a person whose case came before the state supreme court.  The Associated Press, State Bar Urges 
Cleaner Supreme Court Race, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 19, 2004, at 5A, available at 2004 
WLNR 3628487. 
 21. This tape won a prize in the category “statewide radio spot” from the American Associa-
tion of Political Consultants.  These folks are the ones who are gaining more and more influence—
and more and more money—every election season.  As my grandfather would say, How do you like 
them apples? 
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Virginia’s first supreme court election loss by a Democrat since 1928.22  
After demonstrating that this sort of negative campaigning works, Ben-
jamin speaks to the National Press Club in Washington.  During his 
speech he plays clips of his video advertisement featuring McGraw’s 
speech23—much as a hunter might decorate his library with the head of a 
tiger that one of his bearers shot. 
When Caperton’s case reaches the state supreme court, the newly 
elected Justice Benjamin supplies the deciding vote in a 3–2 decision 
reversing the trial court’s judgment.24  In her majority opinion, Justice 
Davis says, 
At the outset, we wish to make perfectly clear that the facts of this 
case demonstrate that Massey’s conduct warranted the type of 
judgment rendered in this case.25 
After the case comes down in the state supreme court, Chief Justice 
Starcher (a dissenter) publishes some strikingly uncomplimentary re-
marks about Blankenship, and the press publishes a photograph of Jus-
tice Maynard (who voted with the majority) having dinner with Blanken-
ship in a restaurant on the French Riviera.  Once the photo reaches the 
media, the court orders a rehearing, and Justice Starcher recuses himself.  
Eventually, because of his remarks about Blankenship, Maynard also 
self-recuses. 
Justice Benjamin, requested by the plaintiffs to recuse himself, does 
no such thing—and in West Virginia there can be no appeal to the whole 
court.  As Acting Chief Justice, Benjamin appoints two circuit judges as 
replacements to serve in the rehearing of Caperton.  After the new hear-
ing, the tally remains 3–2 in favor of Massey; Justice Benjamin again 
casts a vote making a majority.  Once more Justice Davis writes the ma-
jority opinion, but this time she omits the passage saying that Massey’s 
conduct deserves the level of damages the jury had awarded.26  Four 
months after the decision comes down—and several weeks after the U.S. 
Supreme Court grants certiorari—Benjamin files a concurring opinion.  
                                            
 22. On the speech, see SHNAYERSON, supra note 17, at 82–83 
 23. Justin D. Anderson, Benjamin Tells Forum How He Used McGraw’s “Looking for Ugly” 
Speech, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 7, 2007, at 1A, available at 2007 WLNR 10731601. 
 24. The majority’s grounds are highly contestable, sounding in res judicata and in the effect of 
a forum-selection clause. 
 25. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., No. 33350, 2007 WL 4150960 (W. Va. Nov. 21, 
2007, vacated on rehearing Apr. 3, 2008).  Nonetheless, she says, it would be improper to compro-
mise the law to reach “a result that clearly appears to be justified.”  Id. 
 26. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008).  Justice Albright, 
who dissented the first time around, dissents again, in language expressing scorn for the majority’s 
forum-selection and res judicata grounds.  Id. at 256 (Albright, J., dissenting).  The judges appointed 
by Justice Benjamin divide their votes, each joining in one of the two main opinions.  Id. at 223. 
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He rejects “the self-serving due process standard of disqualification” 
proposed by Caperton and the dissenters.  Further, saying he is unbiased 
in the Caperton case, Justice Benjamin denounces the argument for his 
recusal as an exercise in “political justice,” based on “half-truths, in-
nuendo, surmise, prejudice and bias.”27 
PERSUADING THE COURT TO TAKE THE CASE 
Review by the Supreme Court28 in this case is by no means a sure 
thing.  In the larger field of campaign spending, ever since Buckley v. 
Valeo,29 the Court has shown a strong inclination toward leaving the po-
litical market free for buyers and sellers.  When the Petition is filed in 
Caperton, the Court has given no sign that it will exempt judicial elec-
tions from this free-market principle.  Indeed, the Court has denied certi-
orari in several previous cases in which petitioners have claimed that due 
process was violated when a state judge declined recusal under circums-
tances bearing some similarity to the facts in this case.30 
                                            
 27. Id. at 285 n.1 (Benjamin, J., concurring). 
 28. From here on, this locution refers to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 29. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment invalidated parts of the Federal Elec-
tions Campaign Act (1971) that limited spending in political campaigns).  The Court’s recent deci-
sion in Citizens United v. Fed.  Election Comm’n, No. 08-205, 2010 WL 183856 (U.S. 2010), has 
read the First Amendment even more broadly, striking down a provision of a 2002 Act of Congress 
that forbade broadcast of campaign messages paid for by corporations or unions in the sixty days 
before a general election or the thirty days before a presidential primary.  Id.  Citizens United was a 
5–4 decision; Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court.  Id. 
 30. Some similarity, but only some.  Unlike Caperton, any of these cases would have led the 
Court into a factual swamp.  I found the citations of these cases in Roy A. Schotland, New Chal-
lenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1102 n.98 (2007).  This is a good place to 
recognize Professor Schotland’s many contributions to our understanding of these problems, and to 
express my appreciation. 
 In Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1003 (2006), the Court refused to hear a case in which a $1.5 billion judgment against State Farm 
had been given by a trial court and affirmed by an intermediate appellate court.  While the case was 
pending for decision in the Supreme Court of Illinois, State Farm’s lawyers and others alleged to be 
associated with the company contributed some $1.3 million to a trial judge’s campaign for election 
to that court.  He won the election, declined to recuse himself, and cast the deciding vote in a 4–3 
decision that relieved State Farm from the huge judgment.  The connections between State Farm and 
many of the contributors were disputed. 
 In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Wightman, 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 
1012 (2000), a jury had awarded $25 million in punitive damages against the railroad in a wrongful 
death case, and the trial court had remitted the amount to $15 million.  This was the second trial of 
the case; in the earlier trial the jury had found contributory negligence (40%) by the young woman 
who died, and had given no punitive damages at all.  There was a serious argument in the state su-
preme court over the question whether the second trial was prejudiced by the rulings of a judge 
hostile to Conrail.  While the Supreme Court of Ohio was considering petitions for discretionary 
review in this case, two Justices each had received $25,000 in re-election campaign contributions 
from Wightman’s counsel (who was handling this case on a 33 1/3% contingency fee), counsel’s 
wife, his siblings, and their spouses.  Before any decision, Conrail learned of these contributions and 
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The Court’s most recent judicial-election decision offers little en-
couragement for the Caperton petitioners.  In 2002, in Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White,31 a bare majority held that a Minnesota law vi-
olated the First Amendment by prohibiting a candidate in a judicial elec-
tion from announcing his or her position on a disputed legal or political 
issue.  In White, both the ABA and the Conference of Chief Justices filed 
amici briefs asking the Court to uphold the law; their briefs sounded 
themes resembling those in their Caperton briefs.  The four dissenters, in 
opinions by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens, sharply distinguished 
judicial elections from elections of legislators or executive officials.  
Their arguments centered on the state’s strong interest in maintaining 
judicial impartiality.  Justice Ginsburg, in a passage linking the law at 
issue with a parallel prohibition on campaign promises, remarked that 
such promises carried “the probability of actual bias on the part of the 
judge . . . .”32  This language would later play a prominent role in the 
Court’s Caperton opinion. 
Concurring with the White decision on First Amendment grounds, 
two Justices went on to express misgivings about the increasing role of 
money in judicial elections.  Justice O’Connor reported her alarm at the 
strains imposed by judicial elections on the duty of a judge to be impar-
tial, and she singled out for special concern the need for large sums of 
money to run a campaign.33  She has since expressed her regret at having 
cast the fifth vote to strike down Minnesota’s regulations,34 and in her 
address to this Symposium, she rightly deplores the ways in which mas-
sive spending in judicial elections threatens to infect our courtrooms.35  
In White, Justice Kennedy expressed his own worry that “judicial cam-
paigns in an age of frenetic fundraising and mass media may foster dis-
                                                                                                  
moved for recusal of the two justices.  The court never ruled on these motions, but, with the two 
challenged justices voting and one of them writing the court’s opinion, (i) affirmed the judgment 
against Conrail, and (ii) reinstated interest payments that the intermediate appellate court had re-
moved, adding some $5 million to Conrail’s liability.  The facts (concerning prejudice in the trial 
court) were muddy here, too. 
 A third example is the famous case of Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 
App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).  Surely, the Supreme Court would not choose to 
grapple with such a monster absent a clear showing of an urgent need. 
 31. 536 U.S 765 (2002). 
 32. Id. at 817 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 33. Id. at 788–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 34. Matthew Hirsch, Swing Voter’s Lament: At Least One Case Still Bugs O’Connor, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 25575705. 
 35. See Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address: Symposium on Judicial Indepen-
dence, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559 (2010). 
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respect for the legal system.”36 He suggested that a state might “adopt 
recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires.”37 
Six years later, in New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez 
Torres38—just six months before the petition for certiorari in Caperton 
was filed—Justice Kennedy recorded his dismay about the harms being 
done by judicial elections.  New York “elects” trial court judges in a 
process effectively controlled by local political party bosses.  The Court 
unanimously held that this system did not violate the First Amendment 
rights of other prospective candidates.  Justice Kennedy concurred, but 
added this comment on an election process in which a judicial candidate 
must conduct a campaign and raise money in a system that gives free 
play to interest groups: 
[T]he persisting question is whether that process is consistent with 
the perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial 
excellence. . . .  [I]t is unfair to [judges] and to the concept of judi-
cial independence if the State is indifferent to a selection process 
open to manipulation, criticism, and serious abuse.39 
The problems identified by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy are 
built into a system that selects judges (and sometimes removes them) by 
popular vote.  The sensible solution would be for the states to convert to 
the federal model: life tenure during good behavior.  But such a change 
seems beyond political possibility.  By the time when Caperton et al. 
sought review in the Supreme Court, White’s application of the First 
Amendment had imposed severe restrictions on other generalized state 
efforts to protect the fairness of the judicial process from blatant politick-
ing.  Indeed, on the remand of White, the Eighth Circuit invalidated Min-
nesota’s companion laws prohibiting a judicial candidate from speaking 
to a political organization or directly accepting money or soliciting con-
tributions.40 
Caperton’s Petition for Certiorari is well crafted, a model of its ge-
nre.  Of course it does what every brief for a petitioner must do: it gives 
reasons for folding the present case into the existing body of due process 
doctrine.  That doctrine, the petition says, requires recusal of a judge not 
only on a showing of actual bias, but also on evidence that “objectively” 
indicates to a reasonable observer an appearance, or probability, of bias.  
It argues that the Court should decide the case in order to clarify the law 
                                            
 36. White, 526 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 37. Id. 
 38. 552 U.S. 196 (2008). 
 39. Id. at 212–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer joined in this part of Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence. 
 40. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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for the benefit of state courts and other decision makers.  Anticipating an 
argument from the other side, the petition seeks to reassure the Court that 
a decision for the petitioners will not cause a flood of litigation.41  Above 
all, the petition offers an emphasis that persists in the petitioners’ sub-
missions at all stages of the case: an elaborate statement of the facts in 
this particular case.  If you want to get the feel of the case, read the first 
fifteen pages of the Petition for Certiorari.  I have read these passages 
repeatedly, and each time I emerge with a negative assessment of Blan-
kenship.  (I shall not stain the pages of this Review with a detailed de-
scription.)  At the oral argument, Justice Ginsburg referred to him in po-
lice officer language, calling him “a prime culprit” and “the perpetra-
tor.”42  She got it right; the Caperton case, seen close-up, is all about de-
nying Blankenship a part of the loot. 
Soon after the Petition for Certiorari in Caperton is filed, five briefs 
amici join the petitioners in urging the Court to hear the case.  Surely, the 
petitioners need no help from amici in designing substantive arguments.  
Yet the amici’s participation does help the petitioners—and, in my view, 
it helps the Court.  The central issue has turned away from a focus on the 
First Amendment; there is no restriction of speech.  Rather the case is 
located at the heart of concern about judicial elections: how to maintain 
unbiased judging under conditions so toxic. 
Now that the issue is one of judicial ethics, the ABA is on its home 
ground.  With increasing anxiety, its leaders have kept track of the ap-
palling harms wrought by the uses of money in judicial elections—a sub-
ject on which state courts have largely remained silent.  The passage I 
quoted from the ABA’s first amicus brief43 is amplified in accounts of 
huge contributions of money in several state judicial elections.  The brief 
cites national and state polls confirming the widely shared opinion of 
Americans that monetary contributions influence judicial decisions.44  
Even more alarming, “[a] 2002 national survey of elected state judges 
showed that 26% of them believe campaign contributions have at least 
some influence on judges’ decisions, and another 9% believe such con-
tributions have a great deal of influence.”45  The ABA goes on to say 
                                            
 41. Predictions of such floods often come true.  An excellent analysis of the ways in which this 
can happen is given by my colleague Eugene Volokh, in The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 
Harv. L. Rev. 1026 (2003).  (Don’t miss the wonderful Volokh-designed cartoon at p. 1031.)  In 
Caperton, he was one of the counsel on Massey’s brief. 
 42. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 
08-22) 2009 WL 527723. 
 43. ABA brief, supra note 2.  The ABA filed a second amicus brief after the Court granted 
certiorari. 
 44. Id. at 8–9. 
 45. Id. at 9–10 (emphasis in original). 
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that the magnitude and timing of Blankenship’s contributions, direct and 
indirect (through ASK), “gave Justice Benjamin, in appearance if not in 
fact, a personal interest in the outcome of this case similar to those this 
Court deemed to require recusal in Tumey and Murchison.”46 
The facts of both of the cited cases involved what some now call 
“actual bias”: in Tumey, a small pecuniary interest for the judge, and in 
Murchison, a judge’s previous accusation of the defendant in a case to be 
tried in his own court.47  The language about bias in these two opinions 
can be read more broadly,48 but in later cases of alleged bias the Supreme 
Court has not extended the due process clause beyond factual settings 
closely resembling those two precedents.  The ABA brief continues: “If 
the facts of this case do not implicate due process concerns, then few 
judicial contribution cases ever will.”49  There it is in capsule form: After 
White, if due process is to offer any protection against infection of the 
judiciary by massive political spending, it will be now or never.  Ulti-
mately, at the moment of decision, four Justices will opt for never, but 
five will not. 
Next in importance at this stage would seem to be the amicus brief 
of the Committee for Economic Development (CED).  This group, as 
described in its brief, is an organization of business leaders; its trustees 
“include leaders of America’s largest corporations and business organi-
zations . . . .”50  The brief makes an important substantive point, arguing 
that the influence of money on judicial elections threatens to undermine 
the confidence of businesses to make their economic decisions with 
trustworthy information about the state of the law: 
Without exaggerating the predictability of judicial decisions, it cer-
tainly is true that where outsized judicial contributions by parties 
create the perception that legal outcomes can be purchased, eco-
                                            
 46. Id. at 12–13.  Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 
(1955), are precedents repeatedly invoked on both sides in Caperton. 
 47. The judge had served as a “single-judge grand jury.” 
 48. “Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a 
judge . . . which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true . . . [denies] due process 
of law.”  Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. “[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness.” Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.  The Court then quoted Tumey, above, before 
concluding, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”  Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 342 
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
 49. ABA brief, supra note 2, at 12. 
 50. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Committee on Economic Development [on petition for certi-
orari] [hereinafter CED brief], at 1–2, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 3165832.  Of course, this was not the first time—nor will it be the 
last—for business interests and social conservatives to take opposing positions about the reach of the 
due process clause.  The same attitudinal division may appear from time to time in today’s Supreme 
Court. 
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nomic actors will lose confidence in the judicial system, markets 
will operate less efficiently, and American enterprise will suffer ac-
cordingly.51 
In this perspective, the rule of law is not just the cliché of choice for af-
ter-dinner speeches.  It is a base on which prosperity rests.52 
The importance of the CED brief is not that it conveys a new subs-
tantive message.  The rule of law has been invoked by the petitioners, 
and its rhetoric is available to nearly anyone in any lawsuit.  What mat-
ters is the connection between this message and the identity of the people 
who are conveying it.  These titans of industry and commerce are saying 
that the growing influence of money on judicial elections is a matter of 
grave concern, not just to the parties to a lawsuit, but to the health of the 
economy.  Who would know better than they? 
One other point in the CED brief is worth mention.  It may seem to 
be an echo of the ABA brief, but a better metaphor is that the two briefs 
are in harmony.  After reinforcing the Petition’s call for the Court to pro-
vide guidance for the state courts,53 the CED adds: 
On the other hand, if Justice Benjamin’s interpretation of federal 
due process is permitted to stand, state court judges may draw the 
conclusion that due process imposes no meaningful limits on their 
recusal decisions, and public confidence in judicial decisionmaking 
will continue to suffer.54 
The CED is thus making its own form of a “guidance” argument.  A fail-
ure of the Supreme Court to act might, indeed, guide the state courts—to 
the disastrous conclusion that the due process clause is not a “floor” for 
state recusal laws, but a bottomless abyss. 
If any Justice should be surprised to find that the CED is alarmed at 
the increasing role of money in judicial elections, surely the Brennan 
Center’s position is no surprise at all.55  The Center, deservedly respected 
as a think tank for liberals, reminds the Court that the Caperton case, 
despite its extreme facts, is not alone in its high level of spending in judi-
cial campaigns.  The Center’s brief recounts similar levels of spending in 
                                            
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. The CED’s dig about the purchase of legal outcomes is carefully introduced by “the per-
ception.”  No one on Caperton’s side wants to suggest that Justice Benjamin’s vote was bought. 
 53. CED brief, supra note 50, at 8 (“Lower court judges, who in West Virginia and many other 
states are the sole arbiters of motions seeking their recusal, look to this Court to set the ‘outer boun-
daries of judicial disqualifications’ required by federal due process.” (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986))). 
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, the Cam-
paign Legal Center, and the Reform Institute [on petition for certiorari], Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 3165831. 
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Wisconsin, Illinois, and Alabama, along with survey evidence of percep-
tions that such spending does buy influence—perceptions not only by 
litigants (both contributing and not contributing), but also by ordinary 
folk, and even by judges.  In sum, there is a widely held belief that the 
people who make these big contributions are not fools.  The Center con-
cludes: “The national profile of this bellwether case makes it all the more 
important that this Court grant certiorari.”56  And the Court does.57 
AFTER THE WRIT: BRIEFS ON THE MERITS 
A bellwether case, by definition, is one that leads the way for cases 
that will follow.  Is it consistent to argue, first, that the facts of Caperton 
are sufficiently extreme to minimize the danger of a flood of litigation, 
and then to argue that experience in other states has demonstrated the 
horrors of politicized judicial elections?  Counsel for Massey have not 
remarked on this tension, either in briefs or in oral argument.  Perhaps, 
remembering Justice Kennedy’s recent observations,58 they do not want 
to add emphasis to the petitioners’ warning that money is playing a ra-
pidly increasing role in judicial elections and needs to be controlled 
somehow. 
Linda Greenhouse, commenting on Caperton after the decision 
came down, wrote, “The real fight in this case was evidently in confe-
rence, in a closed-door debate that went on for weeks over whether to 
grant [the petition for certiorari].”59  If any outsider should know, she is 
the one.  And yet . . . 
Even now, after the grant of certiorari, it remains uncertain whether 
the Court will agree that the due process clause extends to political con-
tributions.  The four Justices who dissented in White look like votes for 
the Caperton petitioners.  It is conceivable that a fifth vote might come 
from Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito—but just barely conceivable.  
Justice Kennedy looks to be the one who must be convinced; the parties’ 
lawyers know it, and the amici know it. 
                                            
 56. Id. at 23.  Amici briefs in support of the Petition were also filed by Public Citizen, a con-
sumer advocacy group, and by the [state of] Washington Appellate Lawyers Association.  The latter 
brief suggested that, if the Court were to decide in favor of the petitioners, it might consider existing 
state laws governing levels of spending in judicial elections as indicators that legislatures do not 
consider contributions below those levels to be of public concern. 
 57. My guess is that five Justices voted for granting certiorari—the five that eventually joined 
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court. 
 58. See supra notes 36 and 38 and accompanying text. 
 59. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court Breakfast Table: Do Female Judges Have to Quit 
their All-Women Book Groups?, SLATE, June 24, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/222092 
7/entry/2221229. 
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THE PETITIONERS’ BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
Now a new season of briefing is on.  The petitioners say, “Mr. 
Blankenship was the central figure in the trial.”60  He is also the central 
figure in their brief; his name appears eighteen times in their description 
of the case in the West Virginia courts.61  The petitioners continue to 
avoid saying that Justice Benjamin was actually biased, but rest their 
case on appearances, arguing that a reasonable observer would conclude 
that bias was probable.  Such a conclusion is supported, they say, by 
(1) the huge amount of Blankenship’s contributions to ASK in support of 
the campaign; (2) the proportion of those contributions (more than half) 
to the total spent in the campaign; (3) Blankenship’s additional fund-
raising for Benjamin among doctors and others; (4) the timing of the fi-
nancial support—Massey was preparing its appeal to the very court 
where Benjamin would serve; and (5) the fact that Benjamin’s decision 
on recusal was not reviewable by any other judge. 
Toward the end of their argument on the probability-of-bias stan-
dard, the petitioners suggest that “it would only be natural for Justice 
Benjamin to feel a debt of gratitude to Mr. Blankenship for his extraordi-
nary efforts on the campaign’s behalf.”62  This locution seems designed 
to attach the petitioners to the coattails of Justice O’Connor.  They quote 
her remark in the White concurrence: “relying on campaign donations 
may leave judges feeling indebted to certain parties or certain groups.”63  
The petitioners do repeat the “debt of gratitude” phrase once,64 but it is 
not central in their argument.  Even so, as we shall see, counsel for the 
respondents find that it makes a good target.65 
The petitioners’ main argument for disqualifying Justice Benjamin 
is that the denial of recusal, given Blankenship’s contributions to ASK, 
will suggest the probability of bias to an average observer.  To put this 
point in a nutshell: it looks really bad.  The phrase “debt of gratitude” is 
one way of expressing what an ordinary person would think of a judge 
who remains on the court that is deciding the case of a massive contribu-
tor.  The wording may also serve as a euphemism, allowing the petition-
ers to avoid suggesting directly that Justice Benjamin’s participation in 
this case was the quo that responded to Blankenship’s quid. 
                                            
 60. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) 
(No. 08-22). 
 61. Id. 1–8. 
 62. Id. at 31. 
 63. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 64. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 60, at 34 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that Justice 
Benjamin is any less likely to feel a debt of gratitude to Mr. Blankenship because a majority of his 
financial support was provided through [ASK].”). 
 65. See infra notes 88–100 and accompanying text. 
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Let me be clear: Although I am convinced that Justice Benjamin 
should have recused himself,66 I do not suggest that his vote in this case 
was bought.  But surely Blankenship bought Benjamin’s seat on the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and surely he did so with the Caper-
ton case in mind.  By the time this brief is filed, Blankenship has the first 
of his objectives in hand: the elimination of McGraw from his compa-
ny’s case.  “Probable bias” surely is an improvement over a due process 
recusal standard tightly wrapped around the small-change Tumey deci-
sion.67  But the expression does not capture the main interests at stake in 
the Caperton decision.  In a wide perspective, the Court is asked to save 
recusal as a due process remedy of last resort—the only remedy in sight 
to moderate the poisoning of judicial elections.  In the narrowest view, 
focused on the facts of this case, the Court is asked to respond to the in-
justice of letting Blankenship walk away with the rest of his swag. 
BRIEFS OF PETITIONERS’ AMICI 
Within a week following the filing of the petitioners’ brief, eleven 
briefs amici are filed in support, four of them by amici who have pre-
viously urged the Court to grant review.68  Several of these briefs prove 
to be helpful to the petitioners’ case; I reserve the most helpful among 
them to the end of this discussion.69 
The ABA’s brief renews its argument that due process requires 
judges to be free from actual bias and also to avoid the appearance of 
bias—appearance, that is, “in reasonable minds.”70  The most important 
addition to the earlier brief is the suggestion of how to determine whether 
reasonable minds would expect bias.  The ABA says that “hard and fast 
rules” are no answer; rather, it proposes consideration of a set of factors, 
roughly matching those proposed in the petitioners’ brief, but with fur-
ther attention to the relationship between the contributor and the case 
before the state court.  The brief concludes by calling for the Court to 
provide guidance about the demands of due process, “especially needed 
today, when increased judicial campaign contributions pose a greater 
threat than ever to public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”71 
                                            
 66. This view is shared even by Lawrence Lessig, who (with some reluctance) concludes that 
Caperton was wrongly decided.  Lessig, supra note 9, at 109–13. 
 67. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 68. The ABA, the CED, the Brennan Center, and Public Citizen.  Washington Appellate Law-
yers Association, the other amicus from that time, has joined the large group led by Justice at Stake.  
See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 69. See infra notes 76–110 and accompanying text. 
 70. Brief Amicus Curiae [on writ of certiorari] of the American Bar Association in Support of 
Petitioners at 12–13, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). 
 71. Id. at 20–21. 
648 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:3 
The brief of the Brennan Center and its co-amici also follows the 
pattern of their earlier brief in the case, but it adds an arresting scenario 
for the Court to contemplate.  Imagine that 99 out of 100 judges adhere 
to the ABA’s general standard for recusal—already written into law in 
most states, even in West Virginia—but 
an isolated colleague ignores it without consequence—even in cases 
that, under the standard, cannot credibly be described as 
“close”. . . .  Such a state of affairs harms not only litigants and the 
public, but the ninety-nine other judges as well.  ¶This case is that 
scenario in microcosm.72 
The Center goes on to argue that a failure to reverse the West Virginia 
decision would properly be interpreted as holding “that, in effect, there 
are no real due process constraints on recusal.”73 
The brief amici curiae of the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment (CED) makes the same points that it made in its brief supporting 
the grant of certiorari—in large part, using the same words.  Yet this, too, 
is an important brief—and, again, the importance lies in the identities of 
the signatories.  Now the CED is not alone; joining this brief are four 
giant corporations (Intel, Lockheed Martin, PepsiCo, and Wal-Mart), and 
two groups of lawyers who defend corporations in business litigation 
(Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana) and in tort litigation (Illinois Associa-
tion of Defense Counsel).  This combination is a powerful reminder to 
the Supreme Court that the problem illustrated in this case is seen by 
some solid citizens as a threat to the security of legal expectations—and 
thus to a central pillar of a free market. 
A seventh amicus joining the CED brief is Transparency Interna-
tional-USA, a nonprofit organization that works around the world to 
combat corruption in the interest of economic stability.  Here, too, the 
most important datum is the identity of the amicus.  Of course all the 
amici, like the petitioners, continue to tiptoe around any suggestion that 
the Caperton case might involve the actual corruption of a judge.  But 
the presence of Transparency International as an amicus is a soft remind-
er of a larger problem.  As Justice Ginsburg later intimated, one way to 
                                            
 72. Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law et al. at 27, 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).  Here the Center takes 
note of the Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of Petitioner, in 
which all those state supreme court justices agree that the facts of Caperton create an unconstitution-
al appearance of impropriety.  Id. at 27 n.7.  They draw on their own experience as candidates in 
judicial elections to say that, under such circumstances, all of them would have self-recused.  Id.  
This short but punchy brief is well worth reading. 
 73. Id. at 30. 
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protect against efforts to buy judges is to deny “perpetrators” at least 
some of the potential fruits of their labors. 
Still another brief amici curiae, led by Justice At Stake, represents 
the views of twenty-seven organizations that might be called “good gov-
ernment” groups.  These amici include the American Judicature Society, 
Common Cause, and the League of Women Voters.74  The central mes-
sage in this brief is aimed at a Justice who might prefer to leave the polit-
ical-spending problem to the state courts.  Such a Justice might worry 
that a ruling for the petitioners on a due process ground could divert the 
states away from devising their own responses to spending in judicial 
elections.  These amici argue, to the contrary, that a decision for the peti-
tioners in this case will help state legislatures and state courts to refine 
their efforts to do just that.  They suggest various paths that the states 
might follow, from the far-reaching but unlikely (such as public financ-
ing, or a return to merit selection) to the more modest and more likely 
(such as recusal standards based on specific dollar limits, or specific time 
frames).75  If the Court should brush aside the present egregious case, 
they say, “state reform efforts may be weakened or even overcome by 
the Court’s implicit acceptance of the perceived and real threats to judi-
cial impartiality . . . like the ones in this case.”76 
THE STATE CHIEF JUSTICES WEIGH IN 
I have left until last the amicus brief that seems to have carried the 
most weight in Caperton: the brief of the Conference of Chief Justices.77  
The members of the Conference are the chief justices of all the states, the 
District of Columbia, and all the commonwealths and territories from the 
Northern Marianas to the Virgin Islands.  The Conference previously 
submitted a brief in the White case,78 in support of what proved to be the 
                                            
 74. One of the amici here is the Washington Appellate Lawyers Association, thus rounding out 
the list of organizations that filed amici briefs twice in Caperton. 
 75. Brief of Justice At Stake et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11–16, Caper-
ton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22).  For reviews of possible state 
remedies—also ranging widely in their chances for adoption—see Paul D. Carrington, Judicial 
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 
(1998); David Barnhizer, “On the Make”: Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American 
Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 (2001). 
 76. Brief of Justice at Stake et al., supra note 75, at 16. 
 77. One of the principal authors of this brief also wrote the Conference’s brief for the losing 
side in White.  See Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Res-
pondents, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521).  We are left to 
speculate why the effort failed there but succeeded in Caperton.  My speculation is twofold: first, a 
forced recusal leaves intact the contributor’s First Amendment’ protection; second, Caperton’s dra-
matic facts convinced Justice Kennedy that some constitutional remedy was needed. 
 78. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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losing side.  In Caperton, as I see it, the Conference’s brief is influential 
in the decision of the case.  It would claim too much to say that the brief 
tips the scales for the petitioners, but at the very least it is an important 
encouragement. 
The brief’s title ends with the words “In Support of Neither Party,” 
but that recital is a formality.  The Conference first notes that its board of 
directors, in a special vote, unanimously authorized the brief.79  When a 
case involves review of a decision by a state supreme court, a Confe-
rence brief is authorized “only if critical interests of the state courts are at 
stake . . . .”80  Such a brief, says Conference policy, must “not take a po-
sition on the specifics of the decision.”  Thus, they say, the Conference 
does not take a position on the commands of the Due Process Clause in 
relation to the recusal of this particular West Virginia justice in this par-
ticular case.81  The brief concludes with a modest request: 
that this Court clarify the applicability of the Due Process Clause to 
motions to disqualify based on campaign support and articulate the 
considerations that should be weighed in deciding whether the Con-
stitution requires recusal.82 
So, the beginning and the end of the Conference’s brief are neutral.  Be-
tween those two points, however, the substance of the brief is unswer-
vingly favorable to the petitioners’ case. 
One item surely is noted by the addressee-Justices: the brief’s prin-
cipal authors are Roy Schotland and Thomas Phillips.  Schotland is one 
of the nation’s most notable scholars on the funding of judicial election 
campaigns and has been among the first to discuss appropriate responses 
to the growing effects of money in those elections.83  In one of those ear-
ly analyses, he noted that judicial elections in our country “have become, 
and in many more places will become, noisier, nastier, and costlier.”84  
                                            
 79. As you have surmised, the Chief Justice of West Virginia was not one of these directors.  
This brief was also reviewed and approved by a committee including the chief justices of North 
Dakota (chair), Indiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.  Chief Justice Wal-
lace P. Jefferson (Texas) is now the President-elect of the Conference’s board of directors.  I am 
proud to join with him in the Review’s symposium. 
 80. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party 
[hereinafter CCJ brief] at 2 (emphasis in original), Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 29. 
 83. See Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the 
Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J. L. & POL. 57 (1985).  My colleague Stuart Banner 
was there, too.  See Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Cam-
paign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1988). 
 84. Roy A. Schotland, After California, What’s Next for Judicial Elections?, 70 JUDICATURE 
356, 359 (1987) (colloquy, American Judicature Society). 
2010] Caperton's Amici 651 
How right he was.  Thomas Phillips, the co-author of the Conference’s 
brief, is a former Chief Justice of Texas.  He, too, knows whereof he 
speaks, both on the dangers posed by election spending to the work of 
state judges and on the capacity of state supreme courts to deal with 
claims of bias such as the claim in Caperton itself. 
The Conference’s amicus brief offers careful expositions of the 
problem of campaign spending in judicial elections, the limited but sig-
nificant role of the due process clause in recusal cases of the type in-
volved here, and the factors that might be considered in determining the 
application of the clause to a particular case.  The brief avoids the lan-
guage of exhortation, but—without declaring an explicit conclusion—it 
carries the reader inexorably to the decision that the Court eventually 
will reach.  Anyone who reads Justice Kennedy’s opinion and the Confe-
rence’s brief—in that order—will see their parallel lines. 
First, the Conference sets the stage by describing the ways in which 
state judges are selected (including judicial elections), and the increase in 
hotly contested elections of judges.  These contests become “high-dollar 
free-for-alls marked by dueling campaign salvos by organized interest 
groups, often located outside the state of the election.”85  As a result, the 
Conference says, 
it becomes harder for both the candidates and the public to perceive 
the fundamental distinction between the neutral and reactive role of 
the judiciary and the policy-initiating branches of government.86 
The main safeguard has been the states’ codes of judicial conduct, usual-
ly patterned after the ABA’s model code.  But White struck down Min-
nesota’s “announce” clause, and lower courts have extended the White 
principle to the ABA code’s “pledges and promises” clause87 and its 
“commits” clause,88 holding them to be violations of the First Amend-
ment.  In the Conference’s view, these rulings are undue extensions of 
White.89  The chief justices express the hope that the Court will “affirm 
the state courts’ legitimate constitutional role in protecting the due 
                                            
 85. CCJ brief, supra note 80, at 8. 
 86. Id. at 9.  Here the Conference quotes its own amicus brief in the White case, on the dangers 
thus posed for judicial independence. 
 87. Id. at 12 (citing eight such cases, and three other decisions upholding the clause).  The 
clause would restrict a judicial candidate from making a pledge or promise of conduct in office other 
than impartial performance of the duty of a judge. 
 88. Id. at 13 (citing seven cases).  This clause would restrict a judicial candidate from commit-
ting or appearing to commit the candidate to cases or issues likely to come before the court in ques-
tion. 
 89. The Conference also mentions decisions striking down state prohibitions against judges’ 
personal solicitation of campaign funds from people likely to be litigants or lawyers in their courts.  
Id. at 13–14. 
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process rights of all litigants to fair and impartial trials in elective judicial 
systems.”90 
Next, the Conference turns to the brief’s central point: given 
(1) “the sharp rise in judicial campaign spending,” (2) the increasing po-
liticization of the campaigns, and (3) the questions raised by White and 
its progeny for the constitutionality of efforts to enforce codes of speech-
related judicial conduct, 
recusal and disqualification of judges have become ever more im-
portant in States with vigorously contested judicial elections.91 
In other words, recusal is all that’s left as a constitutional protection.  If 
the Court fails to reverse the West Virginia decision in this case, the 
game is over, and the harsh politicization of judicial elections has won.  
This is a potent argument.  And coming from a solid phalanx of state 
chief justices, it is authoritative. 
But assuming that due process should require recusal in some cases, 
the Court still needs a way to determine whether the facts of a given case 
justify such a remedy.  The Conference argues effectively, from a long 
line of due process precedents, that the Court really has not insisted on a 
showing of actual bias.  Even in the earliest case, Tumey v. Ohio,92 the 
chief justices say that the Court “evaluated the circumstances and de-
cided that the probability of bias for this judge was too great for the Con-
stitution to countenance.”93  As the reader progresses through this part of 
the brief, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has never directly ac-
cused this or that judge of actual bias.  Rather it has said, in the Confe-
rence’s words, that “the Constitution forbids procedures that create a 
probability that prejudice will result.”94  Not only is the “probable bias” 
approach desirable as a way to avoid calling names; it is also useful be-
cause “the appearance of likely bias . . . may be the only evidence of ac-
tual bias.”95  According to the Conference, the question must be, not 
whether a fastidious judge is able to resist temptation, but “whether an 
average judge would be tempted under the circumstances.”96 
                                            
 90. Id. at 14. 
 91. Id. at 15 (citing and commenting on Justice Kennedy’s White concurrence). 
 92. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
 93. CCJ brief, supra note 80, at 19.  A cynical view (that I do not share) would treat the Confe-
rence as an interest group representing officeholders.  True, incumbency is a strong asset in a judicial 
election that is not polluted by the harsh campaigning that big money buys.  But if the Conference’s 
brief were motivated by self-interest, Roy Schotland would be an unlikely choice for its author.  My 
recommendation to anyone who is inclined toward the cynical view of the chief justices’ brief is: 
Read it. 
 94. Id. at 20. 
 95. Id. at 22. 
 96. Id. 
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Having asked this question, the Conference of Chief Justices sug-
gests a way of proceeding to resolve it.  Invoking the traditional flexibili-
ty of due process analysis,97 they reject any “bright-line rule” in favor of 
a determination of probable bias case by case, seeking “fairness with ref-
erence to particular conditions or particular results.”98  Recognizing the 
argument that such case-by-case determinations “might open the flood-
gates for thousands of constitutional disqualification challenges against 
elective judges who preside over cases involving supporters and contri-
butors,” the chief justices suggest that this fear is unfounded.99  This is a 
vital reassurance, especially convincing because it comes from the heads 
of the state judiciaries that will have to deal with any such disqualifica-
tion challenges. 
In support of their suggestion that a ruling for the petitioners will 
not open the floodgates, they say, 
we know of only two other instances as extreme as this one [Caper-
ton] in terms of size of the expenditure and percentage of the total 
support for a candidate.100 
One of those cases is the Avery case, described above,101 which culmi-
nated in a denial of certiorari.  The other is a highly publicized case in 
which a rich contributor accounted for more than 90% of the contribu-
tions to one judicial candidate’s unsuccessful campaign for the Texas 
Supreme Court, as well as one-third of the funds raised by another suc-
cessful candidate for the same court.102  I cannot imagine that anyone 
who reads this section of the brief will conclude that the Conference real-
ly is “In Support of Neither Party.”  Surely the chief justices who ap-
proved this text were riled up. 
Now that they have drawn attention to the “extraordinary support” 
for justice in this “extreme” case,103 the Conference offers further reas-
surance.  The imposition of a due process limit here, they say, will not 
                                            
 97. The paradigm statement, as most readers will know, is Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976).  The CCJ does not cite this decision, perhaps because it held that no hearing was required in 
the case at hand. 
 98. CCJ brief, supra note 80, at 23 (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1927) (Cardo-
zo, J.)).  The classic treatment of the general question—long ago called the issue of “absolutes” v. 
“balancing”—is Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
 99. CCJ brief, supra note 80, at 23. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra note 29.  No doubt this reference was contributed by Professor Schotland. 
 102. CCJ Brief, supra note 80, at 23–24 (citing Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Reten-
tion of Judges in Texas, 40 SW. L.J. 53, 84 (1986)).  This reference surely had its origins in Chief 
Justice Phillips’s own memory. 
 103. Id. at 23. 
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routinely subject judges to disqualification just because they have re-
ceived substantial campaign support.  To avoid that result without adopt-
ing a bright-line rule, the Supreme Court will need a standard for deter-
mining whether due process demands a recusal.  Favoring a “probable 
bias” standard, the Conference suggests seven considerations, “neither 
exclusive nor exhaustive,” that are relevant to this inquiry.104  These cri-
teria—the relationship (if any) of the donor to the judge, the size and rel-
ative importance of the contribution, its timing in relation to the case in 
which the donor is interested, etc.—are similar to the criteria suggested 
in the petitioners’ brief and other briefs amici in their support. 
Sometimes, the “fact that the organization saw fit to file the [ami-
cus] brief is the important datum, not the legal arguments or the back-
ground information set forth between the covers of the brief.”105  Al-
though this might be said of the brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, 
it would not be the whole story.  The Conference, after all, is something 
on the order of a collective expert witness as to some of the legislative 
facts106 at issue in Caperton.  In their brief the chief justices were testify-
ing as to: (1) the seriousness of the threat to judicial impartiality posed 
by campaign spending; (2) the utility of a due process “floor” as an en-
couragement of state action to turn the ABA codes of judicial conduct 
into real law, not just tepid exhortation; and (3) the weakness of the 
“floodgates” argument.  I think the majority was paying attention.  Even 
if it be true that “it [is] largely the non-legal information presented in 
[amici] briefs that [make] them useful,”107 the Conference’s considered 
pronouncements on these subjects must be counted as information. 
THE RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
The respondents’ brief, like the brief for the petitioners, is a piece 
of advocacy well done.  Surely counsel for the respondents see imme-
diately that the petitioners’ mention of a “debt of gratitude” is a gift not 
to be refused.  The respondents pounce on it in their opening sentence: 
                                            
 104. Id. at 25. 
 105. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 786 (2000). 
 106. That is, the factual background that informs the balancing of interests for constitutional 
decisions—as distinguished from the particulars of a given case (adjudicative facts).  For an ancient 
account by a young author, see Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 
1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (1960). 
 107. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 42 (2004).  See also Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining 
the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 807, 815–16 (2004). 
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The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment required Justice Benjamin’s disqualification 
on the theory that he must have felt a “debt of gratitude” to Blan-
kenship that created a “probability of bias” in favor of respon-
dents.108 
Later the respondents speak of the “debt of gratitude theory” as the peti-
tioners’ central theory, and lambaste it for sixteen pages.  They repeated-
ly deploy the phrase, quotation marks and all, treating it as the embodi-
ment of the petitioners’ case.  Such a theory of recusal, they say, has no 
limiting principle, for it could extend to newspaper endorsements, group 
endorsements (by a labor organization, a trade association, a civic 
group), or even a governor’s appointment of the judge.109  Indeed, “under 
petitioners’ theory,” recusal might be equally required in a case involv-
ing someone who has contributed to the campaign against the judge’s 
appointment or election.110 
An eight-page section,111 entitled “A ‘debt of gratitude’ theory 
would be unworkable,”112 begins by pointing out that the petitioners’ 
supporting amici have offered various different multi-factor considera-
tions that would be relevant (but not exclusive) in deciding whether due 
process requires recusal under a “probability of bias” inquiry.  The criti-
cisms of the various multi-factor tests include their overlaps, their differ-
ences, their vagueness, and their invitation to courts to decide recusal 
cases in any way they might please.  The section continues with one-by-
one examinations of various possible factors (size of contribution, tim-
ing, importance to the election, etc.), arguing that each factor has con-
tours that vary from one amicus to another, with no clear guidance for 
determining whether recusal is required.  The expression “debt of grati-
tude” is repeated often enough to make clear that the respondents have 
identified it as a phrase worth trumpeting.113 
Another section of the respondents’ brief argues that a “debt of gra-
titude” theory of due process is unnecessary because the states are busy 
considering various means of confronting whatever problems may be 
raised by spending in judicial elections.  Examples of state action noted 
by the respondents are contribution limits (on timing or on amounts); 
peremptory recusal provisions that allow a litigant to recuse a judge (at 
                                            
 108. Brief for Respondents at 1, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (No. 08-22). 
 109. Id. at 30–31. 
 110. Id. at 32–33. 
 111. Id. at 36–44. 
 112. Id. at 36 (italics in original). 
 113. Eventually the phrase does show up in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, but not as 
a capsule version of the Petitioners’ case.  See infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text. 
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least a trial judge) without cause; and even a proposal—in West Virginia, 
mind you—to create a judicial commission to decide on recusal re-
quests.114  This is a common style of argument, deployed by advocates in 
all manner of cases: “There is no problem here, and anyway, someone 
else is handling it.” 
The respondents conclude by arguing that, even assuming a “prob-
ability of bias” standard, such a probability has not been shown in this 
case.  Here are the highlights of this part of the argument:115 
• A footnote says, “Nor is there warrant for any insinuation that the 
pendency of the litigation is in fact what motivated Blankenship’s 
expenditures.”116 
• Blankenship himself did not contribute all that money to the Ben-
jamin campaign; rather he gave money to ASK, an independent 
group that made contributions to defeat McGraw.  Nor did Benja-
min ask Blankenship for any contributions. 
• The contributions to ASK were not made by a party before the 
West Virginia court.  They were made, not by Massey, but by Blan-
kenship, who is neither a party nor a lawyer for a party. 
• It cannot be assumed that contributions to the Benjamin campaign 
were what elected him.  All the major newspapers in West Virginia 
supported him; McGraw refused to debate him; and then there was 
McGraw’s embarrassing speech—the one that Justice Benjamin lat-
er played for the National Press Club. 
Apparently Benjamin did not tell the Press Club how his campaign could 
afford to saturate West Virginia with his award-winning video. 
BRIEFS OF RESPONDENTS’ AMICI 
Mostly, the briefs amici in support of the respondents do little more 
than repeat arguments that were already made—and made effectively—
by the respondents themselves.  One repetition is stylistic, characterizing 
the petitioners’ argument as a “debt of gratitude” theory.117  Other repeti-
                                            
 114. Brief for Respondents, supra note 108, at 46–49. 
 115. Id. at 50–56. 
 116. Id. at 50 n.7 (referring back to id. at 5 n.1, where they point out that Blankenship owns 
less than 1% of Massey’s stock, and note that he has made contributions in other elections unrelated 
to Massey’s interests). 
 117. Brief of Amicus Curiae James Madison Center for Free Speech Supporting Respondents 
[hereinafter Madison Center Brief] at 1, 3, 11, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
2252 (2009) (No. 08-22); Brief of the States of Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, 
Michigan, and Utah as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents [hereinafter Seven States’ Brief] at 
3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 19, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22); Brief of Law Professors Ronald D. 
Rotunda and Michael R. Dimino as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents [hereinafter Rotunda 
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tions are substantive: Amici argue that the Court’s precedents clearly 
limit due process recusals to cases of pecuniary interest and cases of con-
tempt of court;118 that petitioners have not offered a doctrinally workable 
principle;119 that a ruling for the petitioners will set in motion a flood of 
litigation;120 or that the states are the appropriate loci for any needed cor-
rective action.121  Other arguments by amici also echo the respondents: 
for example, the contentions that some amici in support of the petitioners 
seek to nibble away at Buckley v. Valeo,122 or even seek to inhibit states 
from holding judicial elections.123  The briefs of amici in support of the 
respondents may have influenced some of the Caperton dissenters, but 
they failed to move the majority.  Still, three of these briefs are worth 
mentioning, not for their influence on the decision, but because they add 
their own forensic touches—and because they are interesting. 
The Seven States’ Brief (Alabama, et al.124) turns its focus away 
from the particulars of the Caperton case and toward generalized ques-
tions. The brief centers on the capacity of states to deal with recusal is-
sues, the recent experience of states’ experimentation with regulating 
recusal practice, and the likely ill effects if the Court should rule for the 
petitioners.  Such a ruling, these amici argue, would burden state courts, 
would cause judges to over-recuse, and would encourage the deployment 
of recusal as a mischievous stratagem.  The brief goes on to discuss in 
detail125 the efforts in a number of states to deal with issues relating to 
money in judicial elections.  These efforts are ongoing and include re-
cusal measures, contribution limits, and combinations of those two.  Jus-
tice Souter specifically mentions this brief during the oral argument.126 
The Seven States’ brief also offers two rhetorical devices that will 
find their way into the dissenting opinions.  First, the brief originates 
                                                                                                  
Brief] at 9, 10, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for 
Competitive Politics in Support of Respondents [hereinafter Comp. Politics Brief] at 11, 12, 15, 16, 
18, 20, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22); Brief of Ten Current and Former Justices and 
Justices as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondents [hereinafter Ten Justices’ Brief] at 3, 4, 11, 12, 
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). 
 118. Madison Center Brief, supra note 117, at 7–9; Comp. Politics Brief, supra note 117, at 9–
11, 22–23; Ten Justices’ Brief, supra note 117, at 9–11; Rotunda Brief, supra note 117, at 3–12. 
 119. Ten Justices’ Brief, supra note 117, at 12–17; Rotunda Brief, supra note 117, at 12–15; 
Seven States’ Brief, supra note 117, at 18–27; Madison Center Brief, supra note 117, at 24–26. 
 120. Rotunda Brief, supra note 117, at 15–17; Madison Center Brief, supra note 117, at 24–26. 
 121. Seven States’ Brief, supra note 117, at 12–18; Rotunda Brief, supra note 117, at 18–19. 
 122. Compare Comp. Politics Brief, supra note 117, at 22–27, with Brief for Respondents, 
supra note 108, at 52–63. 
 123. Compare Madison Center Brief, supra note 117, at 23–24, and Ten Justices’ Brief, supra 
note 117, at 11–17, with Brief for Respondents, supra note 108, at 45–46. 
 124. Seven States’ Brief, supra note 117. 
 125. Greater detail than that in the parallel passage in the respondents’ brief. 
 126. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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“Caperton motion” or “Caperton claim” as the name for this sort of re-
cusal motion, if the petitioners should prevail. These terms seem certain 
to be enshrined in future due process jurisprudence.127  Second, the Sev-
en States offer a list of some twenty-four uncertainties that will result 
from a ruling for the petitioners.128  At least ten of these will turn up on 
the list of forty uncertainties identified by Chief Justice Roberts in his 
Caperton dissent.  At that time, the Chief Justice says, “These [forty] are 
only a few uncertainties that come quickly to mind.”129  For me, this im-
plausible remark produced an image of four clerks pulling an all-nighter, 
each with a quota of ten uncertainties.  My hasty estimate exaggerated 
their task.  In addition to the uncertainties supplied by the Seven States, 
the clerks could draw on those mentioned by Justice Alito at the oral ar-
gument.  Even so, “The Forty Uncertainties” has an aesthetic appeal, 
evoking the memory of slogans that were popular in China during the era 
of Mao.130 
The Ten Justices’ brief amici131 offers a useful real-world perspec-
tive, which deserves recognition by anyone who seeks to understand the 
subject of campaign spending in judicial elections.  The brief suggests 
that the recent increase in attention paid to state courts may be attributed 
to an increase of those courts’ activity in fields such as state constitution-
al law and tort reform—and a resultant increased interest in state judges’ 
points of view.  The Ten Justices are concerned that a success for the 
petitioners in this case may invite a greater number of recusal motions, 
thus stimulating media coverage, threatening popular confidence in the 
courts, and exacerbating tensions within courts over judicial philosophy. 
Just as the Brennan Center’s briefs present predictably “liberal” 
views, so the amicus brief of the Madison Center presents views that are 
predictably “conservative.”  The brief reinforces the Center’s unswerving 
support for the freedom to spend in election campaigns.132  Taking an 
expressive turn, the Center says that a decision for the petitioners will 
replace a long-standing presumption of judicial impartiality with “a pre-
                                            
 127. The terms were given a running start, appearing five times in Chief Justice Roberts’s 
dissent and once in Justice Scalia’s dissent. “Caperton motion” soon came to the pages of the Har-
vard Law Review.  Karlan, supra note 9, at 100. 
 128. Seven States’ Brief, supra note 117, at 22–27. 
 129. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  Karlan, supra note 9, at 93, quips that forty questions are “double the number in the 
traditional party game and ten times the number at a seder.” 
 130. If you are inclined to take the Chief Justice’s list as more than a rhetorical device, please 
be sure to read Penny White’s powerful point-by-point rejoinder.  White, supra note 9, at 134–48. 
 131. Supra note 117. 
 132. See Madison Center Brief, supra note 117.  As the brief reminds the reader on page 1, the 
Center has defended this position consistently in a series of cases since McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003). 
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sumption of corruption.”133  It also offers a counterweight to the Brennan 
Center’s polling data concerning public attitudes toward the judiciary 
and judicial elections.  For example, the Madison Center’s polls suggest 
that, although people are concerned about the possible effects of cam-
paign fundraising on judicial impartiality, they generally think judges are 
impartial.134 
In Caperton, it would have been hard for any of the respondents’ 
amici to match the weight of the briefs amici offered by the Conference 
of Chief Justices, the ABA, and the CED.  The Seven States’ brief and 
the Ten Justices’ brief did provide material for the dissent, but these ami-
ci had an uphill fight in persuading Justice Kennedy.  And the Madison 
Center, like the Brennan Center, offered information that was useful but 
not compelling. 
THE AMICI IN THE ORAL ARGUMENT 
Of course oral argument normally is limited to the parties,135 but in 
this case, the amici in support of the petitioners “appear” informally, in 
repeated references by the petitioners’ counsel and by the Justices—
especially those Justices who eventually will join the opinion of the 
Court. 
The argument follows the usual pattern, with the Justices posing 
challenging questions to counsel representing the “other side,” that is, the 
side against which the questioning Justice was inclined before entering 
the courtroom.  The argument also confirms another bit of conventional 
wisdom.  At this stage, it is important to be represented by experienced 
Supreme Court advocates.  The parties in Caperton understand.  Theo-
dore Olson represents the petitioners (Caperton et al.), and Andrew Frey 
represents Massey and its co-respondents.  These two are not merely 
well-seasoned veterans of Supreme Court litigation, but first-rate ana-
lysts who are quick on their feet, both in recognizing what a Justice has 
in mind and in offering a response that will move the case in the advo-
cate’s direction.  Prominently seated in the courtroom is (retired) Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, the amica who does not need to write a brief.136  
For some time she has been on a crusade against the influence of big 
money in judicial elections; a year and a half before, she published an 
op-ed article in the Wall Street Journal, titled Justice for Sale.137 
                                            
 133. Madison Center Brief, supra note 117, at 9. 
 134. Id. at app. 1. 
 135. The Solicitor General made no appearance in Caperton. 
 136. I owe this locution to Rick Hasen. 
 137. Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale: How Special Interest Money Threatens the Inte-
grity of Our Courts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25.  In late 2009, Justice O’Connor became 
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THEODORE OLSON FOR THE PETITIONERS 
Olson starts by saying that the constitutional right to a fair tribunal 
“means not only the absence of actual bias, but a guarantee against even 
the probability of an unfair tribunal.  In short—” 
Short, indeed.  Justice Scalia breaks in, saying “Who says?  Have 
we ever held that?”138  Olson offers an example that does not satisfy Jus-
tice Scalia, and when Olson reaches the term “probability of bias,” Chief 
Justice Roberts says, “Probability is a loose term.  What—what percen-
tage is probable?”  And so it goes.  Anyone who has read the parties’ 
briefs will recognize the questions from these two Justices and Olson’s 
answers. 
After about twelve minutes filled with these three voices, engaged 
in the same sort of jousting,139 Justice Kennedy has his own chance to 
speak—and his statement does not follow the pattern that has thus far 
dominated the discussion.  That is, he is not posing a “question” to make 
a substantive dent in counsel’s case.  Instead, he is actually seeking illu-
mination.  This is an important moment; everyone who has followed the 
case up to now knows that Justice Kennedy’s vote will be crucial.140  
Addressing Olson, he says that a decision for the petitioners will make 
disqualification a part of the pre-trial process, and adds: 
Your standard is an unacceptable risk of impropriety or perception 
of bias, but I—I need some more specific standards within which to 
fit this case . . . .  [I]t doesn’t seem to me that the standard you offer 
us is specific enough.141 
Enter the amici.  Olson is determined to introduce the brief of the Confe-
rence of Chief Justices into the conversation.  Their brief said (in Olson’s 
paraphrase) “that we need a standard with respect to recusals for extraor-
dinary campaign contributions.  They said that—”  Wait a moment, 
while Justice Scalia scores a major point: 
                                                                                                  
chair of the O’Connor Judicial Selection Initiative, a program of the Institute for the Advancement of 
the American Legal System at the University of Denver.  The plan is to support state initiatives to do 
away with direct election of state judges.  Good luck to them; they will need it. 
 138. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 
08-22) 2009 WL 527723.  All page numbers in these notes refer to the official print of this argument.  
I have made some minor changes in spelling and punctuation, to correct the transcript’s quotations 
from the briefs and to capture the rhythm of speech. 
 139. Except for one short question from Justice Ginsburg (whether “probable bias” means the 
same as “likelihood of bias”), the first twelve pages of Olson’s argument are occupied entirely by 
questions from Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts, along with Olson’s responses. 
 140. If there has been any doubt about the Chief Justice’s vote, his questioning up to this point 
has strongly indicated a general agreement with Justice Scalia. 
 141. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 15. 
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Was their standard the same as yours?  I mean, that’s frankly one of 
the problems in this case.  The various amici and—and you come up 
with, you know, a wide divergence of standards.  And all of them 
say: By the way, these seven factors or five factors or six factors, 
whatever they say, are not exhaustive; there may be others as 
well.142 
Olson replies that due process, like other constitutional standards such as 
probable cause, speedy trial, or equal protection, “can’t be nailed down 
with levels of specificity.”143  Then Justice Kennedy, still hoping for il-
lumination of a problem that bothers him, says, 
I want you to articulate some substandards that have—that are gen-
eral in nature, that apply to this case, substandards that are more 
specific than the probability of bias.144 
This is the first of two critical moments in the oral argument, and Olson 
meets the challenge.  He first explains that “probability of bias” is a 
phrase taken from the Court’s own recusal precedents.  Then, still speak-
ing to Justice Kennedy, Olson says, 
But let me answer your question this way: When the circumstances, 
including the timing of the contribution, the magnitude and propor-
tion of the contribution, are such that it would lead a reasonable per-
son in possession of all of the facts—these are all words from these 
Courts’ decisions—to believe that the judge would have a difficult 
time being other than biased in favor of one of the parties, that 
would be the standard that would be applied.  It’s a general stan-
dard, but . . . the Conference of Chief Justices–145 
Here, Olson is stopped by Justice Ginsburg, who reminds him that the 
money in this case came from Blankenship, who is not just the CEO of 
the defendant company, but “a prime culprit,” one who “is targeted as the 
perpetrator.”  She wants to know whether this fact is central to the “view 
stated that there is really an appearance of impropriety here.”146  Olson 
agrees that it is, but he makes clear that it is not the only factor—and that 
gives Justice Scalia another occasion to say that this whole “probability 
of bias” notion gives the Court “nothing to hang onto.”147 
In response to Justice Scalia’s challenge, Olson says what he tried 
to say to Justice Kennedy, some six questions before, about the views of 
                                            
 142. Id. at 16. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 17. 
 146. Id. at 18. 
 147. Id. at 18–19. 
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the Conference of Chief Justices.  He refers to page four of the Confe-
rence’s brief amicus, where it says (Olson paraphrasing the parts not in 
quotes), 
we need it; “extraordinarily out-of-line campaign support from a 
source that has a substantial stake in the proceedings”; where those 
“extreme facts create a probability of actual bias.”148 
And then they [the Chief Justices] go on to say, to answer the 
floodgate problem that my opponent raises—this is going to open 
the floodgates, and you will have nothing but recusal motions.  
They explicitly state that concern is not—is “unfounded.”149  “No 
bright line rule can or should be attempted.”150  These are the 
judges—151 
Justice Scalia interrupts to suggest that an easier solution for any such 
problem would be to limit the amount of the contribution.152 
Justice Souter asks his own question, inspired by the Seven States’ 
Brief, suggesting that the states’ own political process is dealing with the 
problem of money in judicial elections.  He notes that West Virginia it-
self has taken some action.153  Should the Supreme Court stay its hand 
and let the states work out their own answers?154  Olson answers by say-
ing that the process of money in judicial elections “is spiraling out of 
control.  There is a financial arms race in judicial elections in various 
states throughout the country.”  Justice Souter responds, “Oh, I think we 
all recognize that.”  Instead, Justice Souter wants to know what the states 
are doing as a remedy.  Olson again invokes the Conference of Chief 
Justices: “They are the ones where the rubber meets the road, so to 
speak.  They are saying, and the entire Conference is saying, we need 
some guidance here with respect to a constitutional limit—”155 
Before Olson can quote the Chief Justices further, Justice Alito en-
ters the fray.  He, too, has the petitioners’ amici in focus: 
Well, they [the Chief Justices] propose a seven-factor test, and all of 
the other amici, who know a lot about this subject, propose multi-
factor tests.  Public Citizen has ten factors, the ABA has four fac-
                                            
 148. Id. at 19–20 (quoting CCJ brief, supra note 80, at 4–5). 
 149. Id. at 20 (quoting CCJ brief, supra note 80, at 23). 
 150. Id. (quoting CCJ brief, supra note 80, at 22). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  Would that really be easier?  Chief Justice Roberts soon interjects the question wheth-
er, given the Court’s First Amendment decisions, the states really are free to limit contributions. 
 153. West Virginia, in response to this very case, has limited to $1,000 the amount of an indi-
vidual’s contributions to a 527 group. 
 154. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 22. 
 155. Id. at 23–24. 
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tors.  In an effort to see if this can be put in more concrete terms, I 
wonder if you would be willing to say categorically that your—the 
holding you’re proposing would not apply under any of these situa-
tions: Where the judges are appointed; where there are massive con-
tributions and a hotly contested election, but the issue is not an eco-
nomic issue, it’s a social issue; where there isn’t any specific issue 
headed for the court but there are massive contributions by, let’s 
say, the plaintiffs’ bar and the defense bar.  Could you say categori-
cally in any of those situations that your rule would not apply?156 
Olson declines the invitation: “I would hesitate to do so, Justice Alito.  I 
think you’ve put your finger on some of the circumstances that would 
take it out of the context of the appearance of justice for sale.”157  These 
are factors to be considered, not categories to be excluded from the reach 
of due process.  It is no part of the petitioners’ case to put the argument 
in order categorical.158  Here Olson summarizes, for he has reserved time 
for rebuttal. 
ANDREW FREY FOR THE RESPONDENTS 
Now it is Frey’s turn, and he quickly picks up on Justice Souter’s 
suggestion about state law remedies for judicial election campaign 
abuses.  He refers to West Virginia’s recent legislation limiting the 
amounts of contributions to 527 groups.  Frey says the Court has “re-
peatedly recognized that this is something that is meant to be dealt with 
through [legislation] or canons of judicial ethics or codes.”159  Justice 
Ginsburg then refers to the White decision’s implicit suggestion “that 
judges could say anything [in a judicial election], just as a legislator.  Are 
you extending that notion—that an election is an election—to this area of 
the appearance of impropriety?”  Frey replies that the present case is not 
about appearances.160  Justice Stevens pursues that point, asking Frey to 
say whether, “assuming appearances only” but no showing of actual bias, 
the appearances of bias would never raise a constitutional issue.  Frey 
explains, “the Due Process Clause does not exist to protect the integrity 
or reputation of the state judicial systems.”161 
Pressing the point, Justice Stevens reminds Frey that the brief ami-
cus of the Conference of Chief Justices proposes a test that would ask 
                                            
 156. Id. at 24. 
 157. Id. 
 158. A respectful bow to W.S. Gilbert. 
 159. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 26. 
 160. This is a reference to a dispute over the wording of the petitioners’ briefs.  In the initial 
petition, they used the term “appearance of bias.”  Later, the petitioners equated that with a “proba-
bility of bias” standard. 
 161. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 27. 
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whether “an average judge would be tempted under the circumstances.”  
But Frey sticks to his guns: “No, I don’t think just appearance could ever 
raise a due process issue . . . .  The question is whether there is actual 
bias of a kind that is recognized as disqualifying.”162  Justice Stevens an-
swers: “The whole point of this case is it has not been recognized.  We 
have never confronted a case as extreme as this before.”  By now, it is 
clear that the Court is considering whether to extend Due Process Clause 
protections beyond the facts of the precedent cases, while invoking the 
more generalized rhetoric of opinions in the same cases. 
Later, in a colloquy with Justice Souter, Frey agrees that 
“[a]ppearance is a standard for recusal, a nonconstitutional statutory 
standard for recusal, in virtually every State; so we already have—and in 
the Federal system, so–”  Justice Souter interjects: 
Yes.  And we have—and we have an “appearance” standard under 
the ABA Canons, but I think it would be difficult to make a very 
convincing argument that the standard was effective in this case.163 
Ouch. 
Justice Kennedy re-enters the discussion, saying to Frey, 
I want you to be able to elaborate your full theory of the case, but, 
just so you know, it—it does seem to me that the appearance stan-
dard has—has much to recommend it.  In part it means that you 
don’t have to inquire into actual bias.  It’s—it’s more objective.  
Now, of course it has to be controlled, it has to be precise.  But I 
just thought that you [should] know that I—I do have that inclina-
tion.164 
This discussion of possible constitutional “tests” proceeds, and oth-
er Justices join in.  After Justice Ginsburg says she has been “taking ap-
pearance, likelihood, probability as synonyms,”165 and Justice Kennedy 
asks “why appearance is never [a] constitutional [test],” Frey explains 
that all of the proposed standards lack any foundation in precedent and 
are too open-ended to be adopted as a constitutional limit.  Frey does say 
that a probability-of-bias standard—although “a very ill-advised rule 
without a historical foundation”—would be understandable, because it is 
“addressed to the right of the party to get a fair trial.”166  But, according 
to Frey, 
                                            
 162. Id. at 29. 
 163. Id. at 32. 
 164. Id. at 33. 
 165. Id. at 34. 
 166. Id. at 36. 
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Appearance is addressed to a different thing.  It’s addressed to the 
reputation of the judicial system, which is not, I think, the function 
of the Due Process Clause to address.167 
This is the oral argument’s second critical moment. 
Here, a reading of the transcript produces a visual image, with Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, and Kennedy all leaning forward to respond.  Jus-
tice Kennedy gets there first, and says, “But our whole system is de-
signed to ensure confidence in our judgments.”  Frey answers, “Well, I 
don’t—I think this is a side point.”168  Justice Kennedy goes on: “And it 
seems—it seems to me litigants have an entitlement to that under the Due 
Process Clause.”169  If any moment marks a turning point in the Caperton 
case, this may be it.  Adam Liptak, writing the next day in the New York 
Times, says, “By the end of the argument, Justice Kennedy’s position 
appeared to have hardened,” and Liptak illustrates his conclusion by 
quoting this very exchange.170 
Eventually, the discussion returns to the “debt of gratitude” figure 
of speech.  Justice Souter reminds Frey that he had said that, even if there 
were a “probability of bias” standard that would trigger invocation of the 
Due Process Clause, the notion of a “debt of gratitude” would not quali-
fy.  Can Frey explain?  Frey wants to make a preliminary point: common 
law did not recognize any “probability of bias” standard for recusal.  Jus-
tice Souter says, “Common law did not have this [political] contribution 
system, which your colleague [Olson] referred to as spiraling out of con-
trol.”171  Frey replies that the real issue at common law was—and the real 
issue still is—whether there should be disqualification for bias.  Justice 
Ginsburg says, “We don’t deal with an abstract setting.  We have the set-
                                            
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 37.  Frey is not suggesting that public confidence is unimportant.  Rather, it is a 
“side point” of the due process inquiry and should be left to state lawmakers. 
 169. Id. at 38.  The imposition of a required recusal may not be enough to maintain public 
confidence in a judge’s impartiality.  In a study of attitudes in a West Virginia survey completed 
before the Caperton oral argument, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira conclude that the offer of 
money to a (hypothetical) judge’s election campaign, whether or not the money be accepted, tends to 
diminish confidence in the judge’s impartiality.  Recusal can increase confidence that the judge is 
impartial, but does not restore confidence to the level existing before the (hypothetical) contribution 
was made.  (Respondents who had not heard of the Caperton case responded in much the same way 
as those who knew of it.)  James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldiera, Campaign Support, Conflicts of 
Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals? (CELS 
2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, July 2, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428723. 
 170. Adam Liptak, Justices Hear Arguments on Money-Court Nexus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2009, at A18. 
 171. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 39. 
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ting of elections, of elections of judges and millions of dollars spent on 
them.  That’s the context in which this case arises.”172 
Returning to the subject of a “debt of gratitude,” Frey says that such 
a standard is unworkable.  Justice Breyer steps into the argument for the 
first time; plainly, he is thinking aloud.173  He says that he sympathizes 
with Justice Benjamin’s concurring opinion denying any bias, and that he 
is not assuming any actual bias.  Justice Breyer offers an analogy: “[W]e 
don’t manacle defendants, because many jurors, maybe not this one, 
would have been affected . . . .”  Then he mentions the huge size of 
Blankenship’s spending, and suggests that a judge supported on this 
scale might also think of possible money in support of a future re-
election campaign.  “And we have the fact of how it looks. . . .  So we 
have all things that make it [the case] extreme.”174  When Frey responds 
that “you have to have a logical principle,” Justice Breyer adds that the 
case also involves money provided by a single individual, and “the fact 
that there’s a case coming up that’s likely for the judge to decide—all 
those things that are listed by the chief justices in their brief, all those 
things together make it a serious risk that there will be bias, even though 
an individual [judge] might not be [biased].”175  Frey’s response to Jus-
tice Breyer, in my judgment, is just what the respondents’ case needs at 
this juncture: “You don’t [want] a decision that’s good for this case only.  
You have to have a decision that’s principled . . . .”176 
Finally, toward the end of Frey’s argument, the discussion returns 
to the “debt of gratitude” lyric.  Frey reiterates the argument in the briefs 
of the respondents and their supporting amici: A “debt of gratitude” 
theory is too broad and too indefinite.  People who run for office roll up 
debts of gratitude in all sorts of directions: newspaper endorsements, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, doctors’ groups, endorsements by political figures.  
Justice Stevens’ rejoinder goes back to the amici: 
[W]hy do we have to rest on just one factor?  The Conference of 
Chief Justices suggested their seven factors should be taken into ac-
count.  Why is that totally unworkable?  Why does it have to be just 
one theory, debt of gratitude, and nothing else?  They don’t—the 
Chief Justices who are elected don’t think that’s the way to do it.177 
At this exasperating point, with the Conference of Chief Justices having 
the next-to-last word, Frey has time for just one sentence.  He simply 
                                            
 172. Id. at 40. 
 173. This is clear from the transcript; take a look. 
 174. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 44–45. 
 175. Id. at 46. 
 176. Id. at 47. 
 177. Id. at 51. 
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reminds the Court of two cases in which Justices appointed by Presidents 
Nixon and Clinton—who presumably owed debts of gratitude to the ap-
pointing Presidents—voted against them. 
OLSON’S REBUTTAL 
Olson has reserved five minutes for rebuttal, and he quickly inserts 
a reference to the Conference of Chief Justices.  First, in rejecting “actual 
bias” as a constitutional standard for recusal, Olson argues, 
[T]his Court has repeatedly said actual bias was something that’s 
virtually impossible to prove. . . .  The Conference of Chief Justices 
said, don’t go there.  We can’t ever determine that.178 
Second, addressing Justice Kennedy, he supports the petitioners’ use of 
an “objective” test (the reaction of a reasonable observer), saying that 
such a test is supported by language that Justice Kennedy himself has 
used in the Liteky case.  Olson quotes that opinion, which asks whether 
“the objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the 
judge’s impartiality.” 179  As Olson notes, that case involved a challenge 
to a federal judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455, but he takes this occasion, once 
more, to invoke the Conference of Chief Justices.  They have suggested 
that the Supreme Court and other courts would be fully capable of apply-
ing just such a standard to a question of bias by a state court judge.180  
Time for the argument is up, and now the case is submitted. 
YES, WEST VIRGINIA, THERE IS A DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Often, following an oral argument in the Supreme Court, reporters 
predict the outcome with some confidence.  After the argument in Caper-
ton, for many observers, caution was the word.  An example is Jess Bra-
vin, responding to a question from Ashby Jones in the Wall Street Jour-
nal Law Blog: 
It seems pretty clear that Stevens will be assigning the opinion that 
will establish some sort of due process test.  Roberts will likely as-
sign the opinion articulating why a due process test in situations like 
this would be unworkable. 
                                            
 178. Id. at 53. 
 179. Id. (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994)).  This Liteky language was 
later quoted in Kennedy’s majority opinion.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 
(2009). 
 180. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 53. 
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I think this is likely to be another case in which we look to Justice 
Kennedy.181 
Some, however, were more convinced that Caperton et al. would 
win—a group that included an Associated Press reporter, quoted in a 
prominent West Virginia newspaper: 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s four liberal members and Justice Antho-
ny Kennedy all expressed support for a ruling that the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of a fair trial could require judges not to participate 
in a case in which there was a likelihood of bias.182 
The reporter’s implicit prediction, of course, comes true, and the vote is 
5–4.183  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy adopts the “probability 
of bias” standard suggested by the petitioners and their supporting amici.  
That is, in the circumstances of this case, “there is a serious risk of actual 
bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions. . . .”184 
Others, in this Symposium and elsewhere, provide critiques of the 
opinions in Caperton and make their own predictions of the decision’s 
likely effects.185  Here I offer just a few words about the appearance of 
the amici in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court.186  He cites the 
ABA’s brief, along with its Model Code of Judicial Conduct, as support 
for the proposition that a judge has a duty to avoid not only impropriety 
but also the appearance of impropriety.  In addition, Justice Kennedy 
quotes the Code’s elaboration of “appearance” in a way that supports the 
Caperton opinion’s references to “probability of bias”: 
                                            
 181. Ashby Jones, Post-Gaming the Massey Energy Arguments, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG,  Mar. 3, 
2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/03/03/post-gaming-the-massey-energy-arguments/tab/article. 
 182. Retired Justice Cites W. Va. Ethics Case, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 14, 2009, at 5A.  
For a similar view, see Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Justices Appear Ready to Set Recusal Rules, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 4, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 22652555.  The Charleston article 
quoted a speech of (retired) Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to an Indiana county bar association, after 
she had attended the oral argument in Caperton.  “It does not look good, does it?  . . .  Why would a 
state want to subject itself to an influx of money into its courtroom?” 
 183. The Caperton case returned to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, to be heard 
by a court that includes only one Justice who participated in the court’s earlier encounters with the 
case.  That is Justice Robin Davis.  Justice Albright, who dissented in both previous rounds, has 
died.  He was replaced by Justice Thomas McHugh (who had retired from the court).  Acting Chief 
Justice Davis appointed Judge (retired) James O. Holliday to replace Justice Benjamin.  Meanwhile, 
two Justices have been elected: Margaret Workman and Menis Ketchum.  The case was argued in 
this court for the third time on Sept. 8, 2009. 
 184. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263.  In his introduction of the “probability of bias” standard, he 
mentions Justice Benjamin’s “debt of gratitude” as one likely element in a reasonable observer’s 
perception of such a probability.  Id. at 2262. 
 185. Prominent in this literature are the comments cited in note 9, supra. 
 186. Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, also mentions the brief of the Conference 
of Chief Justices in support of his suggestion that independent expenditures by a group such as ASK 
may prove counterproductive.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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[W]hether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a percep-
tion that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality and  competence is impaired.187 
As Justice Kennedy notes, West Virginia’s own Code of Judicial Con-
duct includes a parallel provision that (in theory) calls for disqualifica-
tion of a judge “in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”188  More generally, he says, 
These Codes of conduct serve to maintain the integrity of the judi-
ciary and the rule of law.  The Conference of Chief Justices has un-
derstood that the codes are “[t]he principal safeguard against judi-
cial campaign abuses” that threaten to imperil “public confidence in 
the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.”189 
The references to these two amici serve several purposes in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion.  First, they remind the reader that the ABA and the 
state chief justices are sitting at Justice Kennedy’s side of the table.  
Second, the discussion of the state codes makes clear that the majority 
Justices agree with the dissenters on an important point: the main work in 
disqualification cases will (and should) remain in the hands of state au-
thorities.  In nearly all cases—all the Justices hope, and some of them 
may even expect—the Supreme Court can rely on the state courts to deal 
with the impact of election contributions on judicial impartiality.190  To 
recite the familiar formula, the Caperton majority establishes a firmer 
due process “floor” in disqualification cases, but due process remains a 
minimum standard, located below the more demanding standards of state 
codes of judicial conduct.191  Third, Justice Kennedy draws support from 
                                            
 187. Id. at 2266 (quoting ABA ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 
(2004)). 
 188. Id. at 2266 (W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3E(1) (2009)).  The Code is 
written into law, but in this case it was not enforceable against Justice Benjamin. 
 189. Id. at 2266 (quoting the Conference’s amicus brief, supra note 80, at 11 and then at 4). 
 190. Former Texas Chief Justice Thomas Phillips, interviewed shortly after the Caperton deci-
sion, says: 
The majority opinion recognized, even urges, states to pass recusal rules that are more ri-
gorous than the due process floor in order to ensure the appearance and reality of impar-
tial judges.  The Caperton case may cause more of those rules-based motions to be filed, 
and state courts may have to grapple with the types of problems that the Chief Justice 
[Roberts] raised.  And, on the whole, it will be good for these rather murky questions to 
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required to have fair and impartial justices on the bench. 
Tony Mauro, Coping With “Caperton”: A Q&A With Former Texas Chief Justice, LAWJOBS.COM, 
June 11, 2009, available at  http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/lawArticleCareerCenter.jsp 
?id=1202431379110. 
 191. Perhaps the Caperton majority and the dissenters share the hope that those codes may 
come to be more than statements of ideals—that they may come to be law that is enforced by state 
courts.  This result is devoutly to be wished.  Its consummation, however, remains uncertain. 
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the Conference of Chief Justices for the statements he made at the second 
critical moment in the oral argument: Public confidence in judicial im-
partiality is, indeed, a major concern of due process; it is, indeed, an in-
dividual litigant’s constitutional entitlement.  Previously, these conclu-
sions were points of argument.  Now they are the opinion of the Court, to 
be deployed on another occasion, another day.192 
 
                                            
 192. For an early application, see Bauer v. Shepard, 634 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ind. 2009), 
drawing on Caperton in upholding the Indiana Supreme Court’s recently revised versions of a 
“pledges of promises clause” and a “commits clause,” both adapted from the ABA Code.  The adap-
tations were made in response to the White decision, supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
